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Abstract
The article aims to analyze the judicialization of health-
care in Brazil and its effects, especially two brought in-
stitutional innovations: the technical advice centers of 
judges (Núcleos de Assistência Técnica - NAT), focused on 
disputes involving the right to health; and extrajudicial 
chambers of conflict resolution. Such institutes are to: i) 
minimizing the budgetary effects of judicialization and/
or ii) decreasing litigation involving the public health-
care system. From this, it follows that: such institutional 
changes in the Executive and the Judiciary bring nec-
essary changes; on the other hand, the persistence has 
made the logic of judicialization is incorporated into the 
new institutional setting.
Keywords: Judicialization of healthcare; Brazil; Center for 
Technical Support in Healthcare Lawsuits; extrajudicial 
chambers; institucional changes.
Resumo
O artigo tem o objetivo de analisar a judicialização do direi-
to à saúde no Brasil e seus efeitos, notadamente duas inova-
ções institucionais trazidas: os centros de assessoria técnica 
de juízes (Núcleos de Assistência Técnica - NAT), focados em 
litígios que envolvem o direito à saúde; e as câmaras extra-
judiciais de solução de conflitos. Tais institutos visam: i) mi-
nimizar os efeitos orçamentários da judicialização e / ou ii) 
diminuir litígios envolvendo o sistema de saúde pública. A 
partir disso, conclui-se que: tais mudanças institucionais no 
Executivo e no Judiciário trazem necessárias adaptações; 
por outro lado, a persistência tem feito com que a lógica 
da judicialização seja incorporada à nova configuração 
institucional.
Palavras-chave: Judicialização do direito à saúde; Brasil; 
Núcleos de Assistência Técnica (NAT); câmaras extrajudi-
ciais; mudanças institucionais. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
The judicialization of the right to health in Brazil may be generating institutional 
innovations in the system. This judicialization has had unexpected effects, such as dis-
rupting budgetary allocations of public healthcare resources. To deal with such effects, 
many public authorities directly or indirectly involved with the Brazilian Public Health 
Care System have created a series of institutional innovations. These innovations aim at 
i) minimizing the budgetary effects of judicialization and/or ii) decreasing litigation in-
volving the public healthcare system. This chapter highlights two demonstrative cases: 
the healthcare settlement chambers [Câmaras de Conciliação de Litígios de Saúde] and 
the centers for technical advisement of judges (Núcleo de Assistência Técnica - NAT). 
This chapter provides a description of the centers for technical advisement of judges 
and show the still preliminary attempts to institutionalize extrajudicial forms of settling 
healthcare litigation.
We believe that the experiences with conflict resolution and the aforementioned 
advisement centers illustrate gradual transformations caused by internal institutional 
factors that may lead – in the medium and long term – to profound modifications in 
the attributions of different bodies, actually triggering strong innovation.1 The advise-
ment centers do not decrease the number of cases brought to the Judiciary, but they 
might alter the outcomes of healthcare claims in the Judiciary reducing its budgetary 
impacts. The settlement initiatives, on the other hand, have the objective the potential 
of reducing the number of lawsuits. However, as we show in some initiatives, the settle-
ment arrangement admits the judiciary’s direct participation in addressing the claims 
of those who fail to settle. 
These innovations are still recent and subject to change. Thus, it may too soon 
to discuss their potential impact. Nevertheless, our conclusion speculates about the 
possibility of these innovations meeting the goals and objectives for which they were 
created while creating other problems. In particular, both the extrajudicial settlement 
experiences and the technical advisement centers operate within Brazil’s existing logic 
1  THELEN, K. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States 
and Japan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; MAHONEY, J.; THELEN, K. Explaining Institutional 
Change: ambiguity, agency, and power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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of judicialization. This could potentially undermine their capacity to promote medium 
and long-term changes in the system. 
2. THE JUDICIALIZATION OF HEALTHCARE IN BRAZIL
In Brazil, judicialization of healthcare is used to describe the judicial assertion of 
the constitutional positive right to healthcare by individuals who cannot obtain goods 
and services from the public healthcare system.2 In the past ten years the number of 
these lawsuits in the Supreme Court alone surpassed 3,800 cases.3 
This level of judicialization of healthcare is only possible because the 1988 Con-
stitution adopted a system of strong judicial review of individual rights. The right to 
healthcare was initially interpreted by courts as a non-justiciable social right,4 but such 
interpretation was later revised by the scholarship and then by courts5.  In addition to 
guaranteeing an individual right to health, the Constitution also obliged the state to 
create and maintain a system of universal healthcare, which was created by federal law 
no. 8080/1990, and is called SUS (Sistema Único de Saúde, or Public Universal Healthcare 
System). It is meant to offer universal and integral assistance, devoid of any kind of dis-
crimination and under “political and administrative decentralization”.6
2  The judicialization of healthcare in Brazil encompasses mostly supply of drugs – but it pertains also to any 
goods or services that should be provided by the state, as, for example, hospital beds or medical care.
3  Data collected by the Supreme Court in Numbers project at FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro shows that, 
until 2009, 3801 cases concerning court orders for the provision of drugs reached the Supreme Court. See 
ARGUELHES, Diego Werneck; HARTMANN, Ivar. A. Law in the Books and Books in the Court. Are Social Rights 
Literature and Judicial Practice on the same page in Brazil? Annuaire International des Droits de L'Homme. 
v. VII. Athens: Sakkoulas, 2014. p. 15-38. A study funded by the Brazilian Ministry of Justice found 232 Supreme 
Court rulings on the right to health between January 2009 and August 2010. SARLET, Ingo Wolfgang; MOLI-
NARO, Carlos Alberto. Democracia - Separação de Poderes - Eficácia e Efetividade do Direito à Saúde no 
Judiciário brasileiro - Observatório do Direito à Saúde. Porto Alegre: [s. n.], 2011. p. 14. 
4   This view was represented mainly by famous constitutional scholar José Afonso da Silva, who argued such 
constitutional norms were of a merely programmatic nature. SILVA, José Afonso da. Curso de Direito Consti-
tucional Positivo. São Paulo: Malheiros, 1992.
5  One of the very first to defend the justiciability of social rights was TORRES, R. O Mínimo Existencial e os Dire-
itos Fundamentais. Revista de direito da Procuradoria Geral do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro, n. 
42, p. 69-78, 1990. For a comprehensive description of the most commonly used arguments in favor of court-
-enforceable social rights in Brazil, see SARLET, Ingo W. A Eficácia dos Direitos Fundamentais: uma teoria ge-
ral dos direitos fundamentais na perspectiva constitucional. 10. ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2010.
6  Article 7 establishes the following principles and guidelines for SUS: 
“I – universality of access to healthcare services in all levels of assistance;
II – integrality of assistance, understood as the articulated and continuous group of preventives and healing 
actions and services, both individual and collective, demanded in each case in all levels of complexity within 
the system;
III – preservation of people’s autonomy in the defense of their physical and moral integrity;
IV – equality of healthcare assistance, without biases or privileges of any kinds;
V – right of the assisted people to information about their health;
VI – dissemination of information regarding the potential of healthcare services and their use by the individual;
VII – employment of epidemiology for the establishment of priorities, the allocation of resources and program-
matic orientation;
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SUS is run by the federal, state and municipal governments.7  Municipalities pro-
vide healthcare services, states coordinate healthcare actions, and the federal govern-
ment regulates and finances the system. SUS was a relevant step in the decentraliza-
tion of healthcare in Brazil, as it also established the criteria for distribution of federal 
resources among states and municipalities.8  In the 1990s, there was further decentral-
ization of healthcare, through the Basic Operating Norms (NOB-SUS, in Portuguese)9. 
Since then, the financial burden of direct provision of healthcare goods and services is 
largely carried by Brazilian states and municipalities.10
Brazil has a pharmaceutical assistance policy as well.11  The National Medicine 
Policy (Política Nacional de Medicamentos), created in 1998, dictates plans, programs 
and activities related to pharmaceutical assistance for all levels of government (federal, 
state and municipal). The Policy came in the wake of a diagnosis of “lopsided medica-
tion supply, in the ambulatory level”,12 which was said to negatively impact healthcare 
outcomes. The Policy’s determines that the Minister of Health must continuously up-
date the National Essential Medication List (Relação Nacional de Medicamentos Essenci-
ais), which defines which drugs are provided for free in the public healthcare system.13 
These are the ones “considered basic and indispensable for addressing the majority of 
the population’s health problems.”14 The pharmaceutical assistance policy is also decen-
tralized. The National List forms the basis for the organization of the state and municipal 
lists, which are based on the regional epidemiologic profile. States and municipalities 
are responsible for financing these drugs and also delivering the medication included 
in all three lists (national, state and municipal). 
VIII – community participation;
IX – political-administrative decentralization, with independent administration in each sphere of government.”
7  It should be noted that the Brazilian federal system is made up of the federal government, the states and the 
municipalities, unlike other federal republics where the federation is composed solely of the federal/central 
government and the states.
8  The relevant criteria are demographic and epidemiologic profiles, the healthcare network characteristics, 
previous technical, economic and financial performances, the levels of participation in the healthcare budget 
and the existence of a plan for investment and repayment of health services supported by other government 
entities.
9  RIBEIRO, Leandro Molhano. Federalismo, Governo Local e Políticas Sociais no Brasil entre 1996 e 2004. In: 
HOCHMAN, Gilberto; FARIA, Carlos Aurélio Pimenta de (Org.). Federalismo e Políticas Públicas no Brasil. Rio 
de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 2013. p. 151-177.
10  Towards the end of the 90’s and beginning of the 2000’s, two developments pointed in the direction of the 
federal government regaining its capacity to induce the usage of SUS funds: the Strategic Actions and Com-
pensation Fund (Faec) and the Basic Operational Norm for Healthcare (NOAS). The strong decentralization of 
public healthcare in Brazil remains, however.  
11  Statute 8080/1990, article 6.  
12  BRASIL. Política nacional de medicamentos. Brasília: Ministério da Saúde, 2001. p 11.
13  BRASIL. Política nacional de medicamentos. Brasília: Ministério da Saúde, 2001. p.12.
14  BRASIL. Política nacional de medicamentos. Brasília: Ministério da Saúde, 2001. p.12.
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It is within this legal framework that the judicial claims for healthcare goods 
and services gained momentum in Brazil, with a severe impact on Brazilian states and 
municipalities. Their main characteristics are the following:
• Judicial claims are individual, not collective; 
• Most cases request the provision of drugs through SUS;15 
• Claims have a success rate of 90%;16 
• Favorable rulings are not based on independent medical assessments, but 
rather on prescriptions of the plaintiffs’ personal physicians. Such prescrip-
tions may contain drugs that have not even been approved for commercial-
ization in Brazil. What is more, a large part of rulings are preliminary injunc-
tions, which require immediate delivery of drugs.17
3. INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AS A RESPONSE TO HEALTHCARE 
JUDICIALIZATION
In the great majority of cases, the government is forced to comply with court 
orders even if they are not part of the Administration’s plan. This has two effects on the 
system: the rulings impact on the allocation of budgetary resources within the public 
healthcare system and on the management of pharmaceutical assistance itself.18  Such 
effects fall mainly on states and municipalities because they are the providers of the 
main healthcare goods and services ordered by courts. In an attempt to recover control 
over budgetary spending and management of the pharmaceutical assistance, there 
have been anecdotal accounts of a wide variety of innovations in Brazil.19 We discuss in 
15  PEPE, Vera Lúcia Edais et al. A judicialização da saúde e os novos desafios da gestão da assistência farmacêu-
tica. Ciência e Saúde Coletiva, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 15, n. 5, p. 2405- 2414. 2010.
16  HOFFMANN, F.; BENTES, F. Accountability and Social and Economic Rights in Brazil. in GAURI, V.; BRINKS, D. 
(Eds.). Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
17  HOFFMANN, F.; BENTES, F. Accountability and Social and Economic Rights in Brazil. in GAURI, V.; BRINKS, D. 
(Eds.). Courting Social Justice: Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
18  As is the case with the enforcement of any individual negative or positive right. Data on the enforcement of 
the right to health helps better understand resource allocation issues related to this particular individual right. 
An interview with the São Paulo state secretary of health, Giovanni Guido Cerri, exemplifies this aspect: accord-
ing to him, the amount spent on healthcare lawsuits would be enough to build a hospital each month. See:  < 
http://saude.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,judicializacao-da-saude-e-uma-distorcao-diz-secretario,805981>. 
Access in: 23 sep. 2016. See FERRAZ, O. The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health Inequities? 
Health and Human Rights Journal, Cambridge, vol. 11, no. 2, dec. 2009. According to the Attorney General’s 
Office and the Ministry of Health, in a document titled “Judicial Intervention on Healthcare: A Panorama on the 
Federal Justice System and Comments on the State Justice System”, the Ministry of Health’s expenditure with 
the purchase of drugs, equipment and other materials as a result of lawsuits went from 171 thousand Brazilian 
Reais on 2003 to 47 million on 2008 and then to nearly 244 million on 2011. 
19  PRADO, Mariana. The Debatable Role of Courts in Brazil's Health Care System: Does Litigation Harm or Help? 
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (Special Issue: SYMPOSIUM: Global Health and the Law), Boston, vol. 
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greater detail two innovations that have not been analyzed by the specialized literature 
so far, and have been implemented in several Brazilian states: the judge technical ad-
visement centers focused on healthcare litigation and some experiences with health-
care extrajudicial settlement.20 
3.1. Historical Background: the National Judiciary Forum for Healthcare 
In 2009, the National Justice Council (Conselho Nacional de Justiça, CNJ),21 an 
oversight body of the judiciary, created a working group to study and propose con-
crete responses to the problem associated with healthcare litigation.22 Based on the 
work of this group, in 2010, the CNJ advised Brazilian courts to take a series of mea-
sures to guide judges in healthcare litigation. One of the main recommendations were 
partnerships between state courts and doctors or healthcare professionals to provide 
judges with technical support to decide the cases. In addition, CNJ also recommended 
that judges make an effort to base their sentences on medical reports that describe 
the patient’s disease and indicate the needed drugs,23 “with generic denomination or 
the active principle, products, orthoses, prosthetics and general supplies accompanied 
by the exact posology” and avoid granting drugs unregistered at ANVISA (the Brazil-
ian regulatory agency for sanitation), “except in situations provided for in the law”. The 
Recommendation urged judges to consult public healthcare system managers before 
granting injunctions.24 
41, Issue 1, p. 124–137. 2013.
20  The CNJ has recently begun discussing the implementation of a new institutional alternative: the establish-
ment of specialized courts for healthcare in Brazil. A special court for healthcare was set up in Rio Grande do Sul 
and, according to reports from the state Judiciary, has contributed for the decrease in healthcare judicialization 
in the state. See: < http://blogdofred.blogfolha.uol.com.br/2013/05/28/vara-especializada-em-saude-exemp-
lo-gaucho/>. Access in: 23 sep. 2016.
21  The National Justice Council was created by the Constitutional Amendment no. 45 in December 30th, 2004 
and began its activities on June 14th, 2005. The CNJ’s main goal is to control the administrative and financial 
management of the Judiciary branch and the compliance of judges’ professional duties. On the CNJ, see:  RIBEI-
RO, Leandro Molhano; PAULA, Christiane Jalles de. Conselho Nacional de Justiça. Dicionário Histórico Biográfi-
co Brasileiro. In: ABREU, Alzira Alves de et al (Coords.). Dicionário Histórico Biográfico Brasileiro – Pós-1930. 
Rio de Janeiro: CPDOC, 2010.
22  Decree 650/09. The decree itself came as a result of a public hearing organized by the Supreme Court on 
May, 2009, in which over 50 specialists – lawyers, public defenders, prosecutors, judges, professors, doctors, 
health technicians, SUS managers and users – discussed issues related to the right to health in Brazil, identify-
ing one of the core problems as the elevated number of suits filed in the country.
23  Instead of issuing rulings unsupported by sound medical opinions.
24  The other proposed measures were that judges “verify with the National Research Ethics Commission (CO-
NEP), if the plaintiffs are part of drugs laboratories’ experimental research programs, in which case the labora-
tories must take over the continuation of treatment”; “determine, when deciding whether to grant injunctions 
in the context of existing public policies, that the beneficiary be registered in the respective programs”; “in-
clude health law legislation as an independent subject in the Administrative Law program of the public tests 
for becoming a judge, in accordance with the mandatory subjects list established by resolution no. 75/2009 of 
the CNJ”; “promote, for purposes of practical operational knowledge, visitation of judges to the Municipal and 
41Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 3, p. 35-52, set./dez. 2016.
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In 2010 the CNJ also created the National Judiciary Forum for Healthcare – also 
called the Healthcare Forum.25 Its main objective is to monitor and propose alterna-
tives to minimize the negative effects of judicialization.26 On November, 2010, the Fo-
rum recommended that State Executive Committees be created.27 Those Committees 
present a bi-annual activities program proposing measures for the prevention and so-
lution of lawsuits. In June, 2011, the State Committees recommended that the state 
and federal regional courts should enable doctors and pharmacists to provide judges 
with technical support in their rulings. CNJ embraced the recommendation28 and also 
directed courts to advise their judges to contact, when possible, the Health Regula-
tory Agencies (ANS and ANVISA),29 the Federal Medicine Council (CFM) and the Federal 
Odontology Council (CFO) so that these institutions can – within their fields of exper-
tise – issue opinions on the plaintiffs’ claims (e.g. drugs, materials, orthoses, prosthetics 
and experimental treatments). The State Committees also proposed the creation of a 
“Technical Center for the Support of Judges”, based on the Rio de Janeiro experience.30
In 2011, the Forum recommended that courts interact with other stakeholders 
to avoid the judicialization of healthcare (e.g. adopting orientation guidelines to legal 
and medical professionals, instituting mediation and settlement chambers). The Forum 
also recommended that courts support previous decisions via dissemination of best 
practices and for the creation of Executive branch departments to assist judges with 
technical/medical information.
It is out of these recommendations that the two innovations described below 
are born. 
state health councils, as well as to public healthcare units or those affiliated with SUS, medication allowance 
facilities and hospitals with cancer treatment facilities”. 
25  It comprises a National Executive Committee, representatives of the state healthcare committees – which, in 
turn, are made up of judges and judicial public servants of the state courts – and the judicial branch, the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, the Public Defender’s Office, the Ministry of Health, and state and municipal health officials. 
Health law researchers and civil society are also part of the Forum.
26  Art. 2 of resolution no. 107. The resolution thus places under the Forum’s responsibilities: i) the proposi-
tion of solutions to improve lawsuits related to healthcare assistance, including the supply of drugs and other 
products in general, treatments and access to hospital beds and ii) the monitoring of lawsuits related to SUS. 
Also, the Forum must actively propose i) measures aimed at optimizing judicial routines, at organizing and 
structuring specialized judiciary units and ii) measures aimed at preventing healthcare lawsuits. In addition, 
the Forum must study and propose whatever other measures that can be considered pertinent to the fulfill-
ment of its objectives.
27  These are formed by a member of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Federal or State), a member of the Public 
Defender’s Office (Federal or State) or of the Brazilian Bar Association, an administrator and a healthcare spe-
cialist.
28  CNJ’s recommendation no. 36. 
29  For a detailed description, see chapter 8 in this volume. 
30  BRASIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça, Recomendação nº 5.  Brasília, 2011. Available at <http://www.cnj.jus.
br/images/programas/forumdasaude/recomendacoes_do_I_encontro_de_saude.pdf>. Access in: 23 sep. 2016.
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3.2. Center for Technical Support in Healthcare Lawsuits (NAT)
As we previously pointed out, the CNJ and the Healthcare Forum recommended 
the creation of arrangements to provide technical information to help judges’ decision-
making processes due to the increasing volume of healthcare lawsuits – in other words, 
the judicialization phenomenon.31
These recommendations were inspired by the pioneering experience of the 
Center for Technical Support in Healthcare Lawsuits in the state of Rio de Janeiro (NAT). 
NAT started in 2009 as a partnership between the state of Rio de Janeiro health ministry 
(SES/RJ) and the Rio de Janeiro state appellate court (TJ/RJ) with the goal of assisting 
judges in the following healthcare lawsuits: requests for drugs, dietary supplements, 
healthcare material, orthoses, prosthetics and medical treatment.  NAT is under the um-
brella of the SES/RJ’s legal counsel and the TJ/RJ’s chief judge’s department for evalu-
ation and special projects (DEAP). As a department created by a partnership between 
two branches -- the state Executive and the Judiciary -- NAT works with an organiza-
tional structure that complies with formal and informal norms, rules and procedures 
of both. NAT is currently composed of a general manager and four employees, a crew 
of assistants coordinated by a doctor and two pharmacists, and a technical core made 
up of nine pharmacists, three nurses and three nutritionists. The reports issued by NAT 
merely provides judges with technical information. 
The CNJ and Healthcare Forum recommendations reflect an understanding 
that the NAT is an institutional solution apt to rationalize judicial decisions related to 
healthcare services. Several Brazilian states have been setting up NAT-inspired depart-
ments to assist judges in healthcare lawsuits.  Examples include judicial healthcare 
workgroups at the Bahia state court and assistance centers in the states of Bahia, Mato 
Grosso, Minas Gerais, Piauí, Pernambuco and Espírito Santo. Also, there are proposals 
for launching similar support centers in several other Brazilian states. The table below 
provides a comparison of such initiatives. 
31  Recommendation 31, 2010 (“state appellate courts and regional federal courts should propose agreements 
aimed at making available technical support by a doctor and pharmacists to aid judges in making evaluations 
of the medical matters described by parties in healthcare lawsuits, observing regional peculiarities.”). In 2011, 
this recommendation was reiterated by the National Health Forum, which specifically suggested the creation 
of technical centers for the support of judges, with an institutional format similar to that of the one in the state 
of Rio de Janeiro. See note 9, supra.
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Quadro1 
Center for Technical Support in Healthcare Lawsuits (NAT)
Year State Stakeholders Objectives
2011 Mato Grosso 
do Sul
State court, state 
healthcare ministry, 
Campo Grande 
(capital) municipal 
healthcare 
department
Establishment of Technical Healthcare Center 
to assist judges in their decisions concerning 
the provision of drugs, exams, hospitaliza-
tions, clinical and surgical treatments. The 
center is run by two doctors, two pharmacists, 
a nurse and a court servant.
2012 Pernambuco State court, state 
healthcare ministry
Establishment of NAT-Pernambuco.The cen-
ter is operated by an orthopedist and four 
pharmacists. It can be called to action by 
judges in cases where they see fit, especially 
in order to obtain clarifications on medical 
and pharmaceutical issues and technical in-
formation on the requested drug. According 
to the Pernambuco state healthcare ministry, 
943 medication request lawsuits were filed in 
2011.
2012 Espírito Santo State court, state 
healthcare ministry.
Follows the same guidelines and principles of 
technical assistance to judges, especially with 
drug request lawsuits. These have increased 
from 487 on 2009 to 587 on 2010.
2012 Minas Gerais State court, state 
healthcare ministry
The ministry has vowed to provide infor-
mation directly to judges regarding drugs, 
exams and medical treatments in gen-
eral with the objective of assisting them in 
decision-making.
2012 Acre State court, state 
healthcare ministry
The agreement stipulates that experienced 
SUS technicians will provide technical infor-
mation regarding drugs, exams, hospitaliza-
tions and medical treatments, whenever re-
quired by judges, and also by public prosecu-
tors and public defenders.  
NAT is not only being mimicked in other states but its tasks are being broadened 
as well. For example, since February 2012, NAT has been assisting the federal courts in 
Rio de Janeiro, in addition to the state courts. There are also projects for cooperation 
between NAT and the state and federal Public Defender’s Office in Rio de Janeiro. As 
it was initially set up to assist state judges, NAT has slowly increased its reach due to 
demand for its services by the institutions mentioned above.
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3.3. Proposals for Extrajudicial Settlements
The state of Rio de Janeiro is about to create the Healthcare Litigation Settle-
ment Chamber to deliver an extrajudicial solution for healthcare litigation. This is a 
partnership between the state and federal Public Defender’s Office, the State Attorney 
of Rio de Janeiro, the state healthcare ministry, the municipal Attorney for the city of 
Rio de Janeiro, the municipal healthcare and civil defense department, and the state 
court of Rio de Janeiro. These institutions signed the Chamber’s constitutive agreement 
in June, 2012 and, according to information issued by the press, it was an initiative of 
the state Chief Public Prosecutor and the state court. Its objective is to “‘unjudicialize’ 
some of the matters and transport these claims to an administrative solution, untying 
the bureaucracy and speeding up the solution to the problems of our clients.”32  How 
effectively it will perform this function, remains to be seen.
In this case, Rio de Janeiro is following an innovation pioneered in another Bra-
zilian state (Rio Grande do Norte), called “Mediated SUS”. The program started when 
the state Secretary of Public Health, the state Public Defender’s office and the state 
and federal Attorney’s offices agreed to create extrajudicial mechanisms for addressing 
healthcare issues such as access to medication.33  
4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASES OF INSTITUTION-
AL INNOVATION IN BRAZIL
These cases illustrate a key aspect of healthcare judicialization in Brazil: its in-
direct effect on judicial institutions. While a large part of the literature on healthcare 
judicialization concentrates on litigation as an instrument of social change and political 
reform in healthcare, Prado (2013) focuses on the indirect effects of judicialization on 
the healthcare system and on other institutions such as, for example, the Judiciary. The 
author correlates this concern with a broader question on institutional change. To the 
extent that institutions in general are resistant to change, Prado asks whether health-
care judicialization might have “the potential to destabilize a path-dependence system, 
where formal and informal institutions become self-re-enforceable and are likely to remain 
in place for an extended period, despite being dysfunctional”34. She hypothesizes that 
healthcare judicialization in Brazil could potentially have the following effects: promote 
isolated political transformations in the healthcare system; spur institutional changes 
32  Available at <http://www.dpu.gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8597&catid=79& 
Itemid=220)>. Access in: 23 sep. 2016. 
33  See:  <http://saude.rn.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?TRAN=ITEM&TARG=103268&ACT=&PAGE=&PARM=&LBL=Ma-
teria>. Access in: 23 sep. 2016.
34  PRADO, Mariana. The Debatable Role of Courts in Brazil's Health Care System: Does Litigation Harm or Help? 
The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (Special Issue: SYMPOSIUM: Global Health and the Law), Boston, vol. 
41, Issue 1, p. 124–137. 2013.
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on the healthcare system; and, lastly, induce institutional changes outside the health-
care system. The third type of change refers to transformations on entities that do not 
belong to the healthcare system. Prado specifically highlights changes that judicializa-
tion could cause to the Judiciary. 
Building up from these hypotheses, we can consider the institutional meaning 
of the creation of the Healthcare Forum, the NAT and some other extrajudicial settle-
ment experiences as reactions to the healthcare judicialization. 
1. The innovations described here do not seem to reveal an impact of health-
care judicialization over isolated policies within the healthcare system.
2. These innovations have an effect on healthcare system institutions. First, as 
courts set out to collaborate with other institutions that participate directly 
in the healthcare system, such as state healthcare ministries, for example, a 
new institution is created within this system. This is the case with NATs, the 
hybrid institutional system developed to assist judges with their rulings on 
healthcare. The problem is that NAT does not change how the healthcare 
system operates in providing its services. Thus, the second hypothesis may 
be more clearly illustrated by the case of the extrajudicial settlement initia-
tives – in which the Judiciary will be incorporated into an administrative 
decision-making structure of the public healthcare system. Should these 
experiences proliferate and become relevant, a new institutional solution 
to solve disputes – that is not fully administrative nor fully judicial – will be 
spawned in the health care system of Brazil.  
3. These innovations seem to indicate a change in the judicial procedures relat-
ed to petitions for healthcare goods and services within the Judiciary itself. 
However, this is not a direct change as the examples provided by Prado, that 
is, a – superior – court ordering that judicial procedures be changed. Instead, 
the innovations were recommended by CNJ and adopted by courts volun-
tarily.  However, the implementation of NAT means the adoption of new pro-
cedures inside the courts whereby judges start to be advised and rulings 
start to be influenced by a technical report issued regularly and systemati-
cally by the staff of a healthcare ministry. Adherence to this practice could 
cause significant changes in court order dynamics. Such changes might in 
turn effect substantive transformations as well.35
35  The judicialization of the right to healthcare can also affect the relationship between the Executive and 
the Judiciary. See OLIVEIRA, Vanessa E.; NORONHA, Lincoln. Judiciary-Executive relations in policy making: the 
case of drug distribution in the state of São Paulo. Brazilian Political Science Review, v. 5, n. 2, p. 10-38. 2011. 
The authors performed empirical research of the São Paulo State Healthcare Department documents and of 
Supreme Court and CNJ rulings and came to the conclusion that the relationship between the Judiciary and 
the Executive is at first confrontational, but later becomes complementary: “The Executive responded to judi-
cial activism by creating more efficient policies and providing more access to medication for its citizens; the 
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While the hypotheses provided by Prado allow us to classify the observable 
changes that have occurred so far in the system, there may be further changes yet to 
be analyzed, as we describe below. 
4.1. Changes
These new spaces for decision-making and dialogue among stakeholders – the 
establishment and institutionalization of the technical advisement centers and the 
yet emerging extrajudicial settlement experiences– reflect a process of institutional 
change that could potentially have broader effects than the ones observed so far. These 
experiences could thus make for interesting cases to be used in analyzing the broader 
process of institutional change and innovation. 
The literature on institutional change has been enriched with new formulations 
about the processes whereby gradual modifications of institutions are implemented 
over time. As Mahoney and Thelen (2010) alert in an article dedicated to the theory of 
gradual institutional change, the specialized literature deploys theories to explain why 
several kinds of basic institutional configurations appear in certain cases and on certain 
times and why specific institutions are terminated and replaced with others. But the 
literature remains shallow when it comes to theories that explain the gradual devel-
opment of existing institutions. Instead the literature has focused mostly on change 
caused by external factors, based on the premise that institutions dispose of strong 
reproduction mechanisms, which would encumber or make difficult changes provoked 
by factors endogenous to the institutions.36 
One of the main factors explaining the resilience of institutions is the legacy of 
their own results. Thus, for example, studies on social welfare policies show that left-
wing parties were fundamental for the establishment of universal social assistance 
policies. Such policies, once put in place, become a focal point of political dispute, but 
hardly ever suffer restrictions –even in center or right-wing governments – due to their 
electoral appeal and pressure by their beneficiaries37. Overall, the legacy created by 
institutions affects the preferences of those playing a role within them, gelling out-
going interests and the opportunity structure of these players’ actions (what they can 
do, when and how), consolidating an action structure composed both of points and 
Judiciary keeps pushing for the distributions of new medications  and medical supplies, but now it pays more 
attention to technical issues argued for by the Executive's administrators (...)”. OLIVEIRA, Vanessa E.; NORONHA, 
Lincoln. Judiciary-Executive relations in policy making: the case of drug distribution in the state of São Paulo. 
Brazilian Political Science Review, v. 5, n. 2, p. 10-38. 2011. p. 33-34.
36  PIERSON, P. Politics in Time: history, institutions, and social analysis. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2004. 
37  See HUBER, E.; STEPHENS, J. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: parties and policies in global 
markets. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001, and PIERSON, P. Dismantling the Welfare State?: Reagan, 
Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
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players with veto over changes.38  Therefore, to some authors, regardless of the motiva-
tions of political players, institutional changes tend to be incremental. Even if formal 
changes are rare, this doesn’t mean that institution would suffer internal modifications 
over time.39 To other authors, changes wouldn’t even be gradual, rather they would 
constitute sporadic events generated by external factors or critical events. According to 
this view, deeper institutional changes would be explained predominantly by external 
factors and would hardly or never at all be caused by “inside” players40.
Considering the empirical evidence on institutional change and with the afore-
mentioned institutional debate in mind, Thelen (2004) suggests that a) in many cases, 
institutions are resistant even to external changes; that is, jolts fail to stimulate innova-
tion in certain situations and that b) gradual changes caused by internal factors in the 
institutional structure may lead, on the medium and long term to profound alterations 
in the attributions of institutions, provoking actual substantial innovation. For the au-
thor, what is surprising about institutions is that over time they seem to change both a 
lot and very little.  This apparent contradiction may be explained by the fact that institu-
tions are formally resilient over time, but their attributions, the players that take part on 
them, or even the beliefs and conceptions about what they should do, actually change, 
along with all the kind of social, political, cultural change that certain communities are 
subject to. 
With this perspective in mind, Thelen (2004) posits that the analysis of institu-
tional change fall on the causal mechanisms that produce it. This, in turn, directs analy-
sis to the action and interaction of relevant players inside institutions. We thus notice 
an effort by this literature to overcome the institutional innovation versus institutional 
reproduction dichotomy, focusing on institutional persistence in the face of external 
shocks and institutional change within institutions themselves. In order to put aside 
this opposition, Thelen emphasizes the possibility of crises or “turning points” being 
endogenously generated and invites us to ponder the ways by which new problems 
and solutions that present themselves to relevant players within a certain institutional 
framework as products of the past and not as historical accidents. Her proposition is 
that institutions be conceived not only as restrictions to the engagements of relevant 
players, but rather also as strategic resources that may be mobilized by them as answers 
to changes in the social, economic and political context. 
38  See TSEBELIS, G. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. New Jersey: Princeton Universtity Press, 2002; 
IMMERGUT, E. Institutional Constraints on Policy. In: MORAN, Michel; REIN, Martin; GOODIN, Robert. E (eds.).. 
The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 557-571. According to Tse-
belis’ classic definition a player is a veto player if its agreement is a requirement for a change in the status quo. 
39  BAUMGARTNER, F.; JONES, B. Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 2009. 
40  DIERMEIER, D.; KREHBIEL, K. Institutionalism as a Methodology. Journal of Theoretical Politics, London, 
Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, vol. 15, no 2, p. 123-144, apr.  2003. 
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 3, n. 3, p. 35-52, set./dez. 2016.48 
Leandro Molhano Ribeiro | Ivar Alberto Hartmann
Analytically, as she attempts to overcome the innovation-reproduction contrast, 
Thelen introduces a conception of institutional change through layering and conver-
sion. The first case – layering – involves, on the part of relevant players, the renegotia-
tion of some elements of a group of institutions. This might occur in contexts where, 
faced with lack of support to radically alter or substitute a particular institution, certain 
players begin to negotiate with opposing players to add new institutions to the exist-
ing arrangement as a solution to an emerging problem. The “innovators” thus accom-
modate to the pre-existing structures and practices.  Conversion means the process by 
means of which institutions designated to certain objectives are used for other pur-
poses. These concepts are useful to describe the changes observed in Brazil. The expe-
riences proposed by the Healthcare Forum and, up until now, the one with the NATs 
seem to be both institutional change through layering – e.g. the new spaces created 
within the Judiciary –and through conversion – e.g. the Judiciary performing a role in 
extrajudicial settlements. Healthcare judicialization appears, therefore, to have induced 
endogenous changes in the sense indicated by the literature.
Once we have classified these changes as such, and with the academic discus-
sion on institutional change in mind, we can speculate that the process of healthcare 
judicialization in Brazil may propel further changes in the institutional framework of the 
healthcare system. As we pointed out before, the Judiciary could, using the initiatives 
proposed at the Healthcare Forum and implemented in the existing NAT and extrajudi-
cial settlement experiences, modify the structure of the provision of healthcare goods 
and services. This is due either to the direct entrance of a new player in decision-making 
– the Judiciary – or, since new avenues for interactions are set up, to the interactions be-
tween healthcare players.  The long-term effects of such participation and of the inter-
actions that may arise between them could greatly alter the institutional arrangement 
of Brazil’s healthcare system. 
Literature on institutional change by endogenous factors suggests that the fo-
cus of analysis be directed to the action and interaction of players internal to the institu-
tions. The analytical model to explain public policy decisions can take into account 1) 
the rationality model involved: whether limited rationality (due to lack of information) 
or not; and 2) the decision-making context, whether ambiguous (marked by ambiva-
lence; several possible ways to make a decision) or not41. According to the classifica-
tion of the rationality model and that of the action context, the theoretical approach 
to understanding the process for choosing public policy alternatives (or institutional 
alternatives) can be based on the rational school (the player has information to guide 
41  See ZAHARIADIS, N. Comparing Three Lenses of Policy Choice. Policy Studies Journal, Washington, vol. 26, 
issue 3, p. 434-448, sep. 1998.
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his actions and the context isn’t one of ambiguity) or on other models when rationality 
is limited and there is indeed ambiguity in the context of decision-making42. 
An interesting fact is that the choice of an institutional alternative can be marked 
by limited rationality in a context of ambiguity, but its institutionalization might lead to 
overcoming the limitation as well as the ambiguity. This means that the action, interac-
tion and strategy of players that participate in the creation and institutionalization of 
an innovation may transform itself over time, suggesting that the endogenous factors 
for explaining the transformation are themselves variable, according to specific phases 
of institutional change. To what extent these theoretical propositions occurred with 
the creation process of the NATs and the extrajudicial settlement experiences remains 
to be explored. 
4.2. Persistence
Although the initiatives proposed and implemented by the Judiciary to deflect 
the unwanted effects of healthcare judicialization – especially over the planned health-
care budget itself and the management of pharmaceutical assistance – seem to indi-
cate a change in the institutional arrangement of the public healthcare system, a core 
characteristic of healthcare goods and services provision appears to linger on and even 
strengthen itself: the logic of judicialization.
This logic is seemingly present in all proposed and implemented initiatives de-
scribed in the second section of this chapter. In the case of NATs, the officially stated ob-
jective isn’t to stop or even reduce the amount of healthcare lawsuits – even though a 
decrease in the number of successful plaintiffs would possibly discourage other people 
from going to court. In the case of extrajudicial settlement experiences planned by the 
Judiciary an intriguing effect could come into play: a sort of “contamination” of this pro-
cess by the judicialized behavior of the entities involved in it. 
Such “contamination” could be deduced and adapted from a definition of judi-
cialization postulated by Tate and Valinder (1995) in a book dedicated to the analysis of 
the Judiciary’s expansion in several countries that became a relevant reference on the 
subject.43 The authors divide analytically the concept of judicialization – in this case, 
the judicialization of politics, which refers to 1) a “more dramatic” transference phe-
nomenon: normative decisions by the legislator or the Administration flow to the Ju-
diciary, something that occurs mainly by means of constitutional review mechanisms; 
and 2) a “less dramatic” phenomenon whereby decision-making and conflict resolution 
42  Basically, in this case the literature points to the use of Kingdom’s “multiple flux model”. KINGDOM, J. Agen-
das, Alternatives, and Public Policies. London: Addison-Wesley Educational Publisher, 1995.
43   TATE, C. Neal; VALLINDER, T. The Global Expansion of Judicial Power. New York: New York University Press, 1995.
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methods akin to courts are incorporated by different administrative departments. This 
second possible meaning of judicialization is the one we find relevant here. 
What we observe in Brazil is the incorporation of judicial methods and proce-
dures in order to solve conflicts of interest, with the risk, should these methods and 
procedures not be followed, of a lawsuit being filed with a claim for healthcare benefits. 
In other words, not only is the Judiciary directly playing a role in extrajudicial conflict 
solving, but its modus operandi casts a shadow over the other players. It seems that de-
spite the desire of federal, state and municipal governments to tourniquet the budget 
bleeding of healthcare judicialization, efforts to that effect have had a catch-22 role of 
making the judicialization logic even more pervasive.
5. CONCLUSION
The current institutional environment in the context of Brazilian healthcare 
provision is very peculiar: the full justiciability of the individual right to health has 
prompted the Judiciary and the Executive branches to adapt to the new phenomena of 
high volume of litigation with significant impacts on judicial practice and state budget 
management. 
The analysis of innovations implemented in response to this has showed that 
different elements of the current institutional theory must be borrowed from differ-
ent theories, creating a puzzle that doesn’t necessarily present uniformity. Institutional 
change in the Executive and the Judiciary have caused existing departments to adapt 
and new ones to emerge.  Persistence, on the other hand, has meant that the judicial-
ization logic is embedded the new institutional configuration. We hope to have shown, 
above all, that healthcare judicialization in Brazil and its institutional reactions point to 
the need for new developments on institutional design literature.
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